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“kidneys were in his mind…”
he first thing we learn about leopold bloom is his taste for dishes fea-
turing “the inner organs of beasts and fowls,” including “thick giblet soup,
nutty gizzards, a stuffed roast heart, liver slices fried with crustcrumbs, fried
hencod’s roes,” and “most of all … grilled mutton kidneys” (U 4.1-4).1 this
introduction to bloom, through his (decidedly non-kosher) consumption
of animal organs, motivates the opening sentence of the next paragraph:
“kidneys were in his mind as he moved about the kitchen softly,” the nar-
rator tells us (U 4.6). this is a strange locution, but one that might pass our
notice given the context (as it indeed had passed mine the first twenty or
so times i read this section). of course, the context asks us to interpret the
lines as bloom merely thinking about kidneys as he contemplates his
breakfast options on this warm June morning. but the phrasing reverses
subject and object; rather than the more conventional “bloom was think-
ing about kidneys,” or perhaps, “bloom had kidneys in his mind,” the kid-
neys (albeit a subject of a passive construction) nonetheless take sequen-
tial precedence over bloom’s “mind.” the strange syntax defamiliarizes
the image, and momentarily presents a literal picture of a mutton kidney
stuffed into a man’s head, a brief image of absurdity that quickly dissipates
into the main action of the paragraph: bloom preparing his wife’s morn-
ing tea and contemplating his own hunger.
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one of the reasons the clause “kidneys were in his mind” stands out
to me is the incongruity of the two nouns. “kidneys”: physical, visceral,
bloody; “mind”: incorporeal, abstract, ethereal. (had Joyce doubled down
on his bodily organs and written, “kidneys were in his brain,” the passage
would be more immediately funny, but certainly less subtle.) the narrator,
in the introduction of the novel’s main character, has shown us a “mind”
that comes into linguistic being only as it is filled with the material of the
object world. this is no ordinary, inert, dead thing, however; it is the
“inner organ” of a mammalian animal. what occupies bloom’s con-
sciousness, then, is a crucial part of the functioning physiology of a pre-
viously living creature (and bloom, it should be noted, highlights his con-
nection to the bodily function of the food he eats by commenting favor-
ably on the “fine tang of faintly scented urine” that he savors in mutton
kidneys (U 4.4-5)). the physiological nature of the organs that bloom
consumes stands in sharp contrast to the disembodiment of the cartesian
“mind.” Joyce’s syntactical reversal is also a subtle undoing of the priori-
ty of mind over matter. bloom’s mind passively receives objects such as
kidneys, rather than actively direct its efforts toward a rational, intention-
al mastery of res extensa.2
as i will argue, i do not think Joyce’s syntactical reversal of mental
and object worlds is an accident. this brief, nearly unremarkable, exam-
ple sets up a technique that will characterize the representation of leopold
bloom’s consciousness in chapters four through six of Ulysses
(“calypso,” “lotus-eaters,” and “hades”). i draw upon both cognitive-
based approaches to narrative as well as object-oriented materialist phi-
losophy to offer a more granular account of bloom’s “mind” in these
chapters. bloom, i believe, embodies a truth about fictional minds that
very few critics have been willing to grant: that they are contingent, net-
worked entities that exist moment-to-moment in complex relations with
other human and nonhuman objects. in her book, Vibrant Matter, political
philosopher Jane bennett refers to this mode as “distributive agency” (21)
or (following gilles deleuze and felix guattari) an “assemblage” (23).
bennett’s work, though coming out of a philosophical tradition of imma-
nent vitalism that draws from spinoza, deleuze, and bruno latour, can
inform more nuanced conceptions of fictional representations of con-
sciousness. bennett advances a model of agency that grants agentic pow-
ers to nonhuman things while also acknowledging that humans are still
privileged actors within such assemblages. her work, along with other
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object- and nonhuman-oriented philosophers such as levi bryant,
timothy morton, and graham harman, can help us develop new concep-
tions of the novel that account for the agency, actions, and traits of char-
acters in a more particular and persuasive way. rather than assume that
characters are pre-formed entities who have coherent and determinate
qualities prior to their narrative presentation, we can use the close-reading
techniques of narrative theory to discover how literary characters come to
us within a network of objects and forces that we typically ascribe to a
nonhuman background. ideally, this attention to the enmeshed networks of
the nonhuman and human will help readers simultaneously attend to
aspects of fiction that are typically ignored and give us a more refined,
dynamic picture of the characters that prompt our readerly investment in
fiction.
leopold bloom offers an ideal exemplum for this approach. while
the specific portrayal of bloom pushes him toward a more externally con-
structed state than many modernist protagonists (including stephen
dedalus, as we shall see), the genre of fiction still, unavoidably, presents a
bias toward the unit of the individual human subject. to be clear, i make
this assertion with no value judgement; indeed, it is hard to imagine a cor-
pus of novels that do not feature human or anthromorphized agents in one
form or another. i read bloom, then, neither as an epiphenomenon of exter-
nal objects and forces, nor as a bounded, internalized cartesian cogito.
with kidneys – as well as cats, newspapers, odors, corpses, and various
other things – inhabiting and, i will argue, constituting his mind, bloom
can be understood as a character whose mind is constructed through a con-
tinual interface and interaction with an exterior world. Joyce writes
bloom’s networked mind unlike stephen dedalus, the other main con-
sciousness of the early chapters of Ulysses. stephen’s mind, in contrast to
bloom’s, is presented through a similar narratorial mode but in a marked-
ly different style, one that represents a more conventional, interiorized,
self-aware consciousness. where the narration in stephen’s chapters
(“telemachus,” “nestor,” and “proteus”) carefully guards the border
between internal and external worlds, bloom’s narration gives the effect
of a device capturing impressions and sensations from an external world
and reproducing them without a well-formed, a priori consciousness of
“self.” i conclude that, ironically, it is precisely because bloom’s mind is
largely constructed through an assemblage of external objects that he is
frequently cited as the most complete picture of consciousness in fiction. 
my claims ultimately support the humanist position that bloom is a
singular case of narrative discourse approximating the complex processes
of human cognition and consciousness. but my reasons for claiming this
are quite the opposite of many: i do not take for granted that bloom is a
pre-existing cogito that enters into a connection with an external, objec-
tive world. instead, i take the suggestion literally that “kidneys were in his
mind”: the mind comes into being within a relational network of objects,
and its operations can only be identified and named a posteriori.
Narrative theory and the distributed mind
one of the unexamined assumptions about the fictional presentation of
consciousness is the ontological priority of the individual mind. based on
this premise, even radical modernist experimentation with narrative could
fit comfortably within the humanist conception of the novel. 
cognitive approaches to narrative have redressed this bias toward
human consciousness, mainly by questioning the guarded boundaries that
seem to cordon off fictional characters within an existential isolation (rep-
resented in canonical modernism by marlow’s assertion in Heart of
Darkness that “we live as we dream – alone …” (conrad 33)). the typi-
cal mode for social interaction in this isolationist view is one highlighted
by miscommunication and misunderstanding. cognitive narrative theo-
rists such as david herman, lisa zunshine, and alan palmer question this
inaccessibility of the mind.3 herman sums up a significant distinction
between classical narrative theory and postclassical cognitive-based
approaches: as socially situated readers, we draw upon “the rough-and-
ready heuristics to which [we] resort in thinking about thinking itself. we
use these heuristics to impute motives or goals to others, to evaluate the
bases of our own conduct, and to make predictions about future reactions
to events”(253). this claim suggests that represented consciousness
always has an outward-facing aspect, a condition often veiled by the
emphasis on interiority given by so much literary criticism of the novel.
in Fictional Minds (2007) and Social Minds in the Novel (2010)4,
palmer highlights three mental “tools” that enable the mind’s distributed,
extended, externalized capabilities, or what he calls “the mind beyond the
skin” (FM 160, SMN 42-3): language, physically distributed cognition, and
intermental thinking. his main focus is on the third of these, as his aim is
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to reposition fictional consciousness as a primarily social, interpersonal
entity. i would like, however, to amplify the relatively scant attention he
gives to the second of these tools, physically distributed, or situated, cog-
nition. situated cognition presumes that thinking is impossible without the
aid of tools – be they the writer’s notebook, pencil, or computer keyboard
and screen, the airline pilot’s cockpit, display panels, and crew, or the musi-
cian’s instrument, sheet music, and collaborators. many of the thinkers
from which palmer draws, including daniel dennett, still prioritize mind
over matter (FM 160)). in dennett’s view, the mind is still an interior enti-
ty existing prior to its being fanned out into an external, material environ-
ment.5 palmer, however, phrases this process in a way that downplays the
separation of an inner mind: physically distributed cognition simply
acknowledges “the fact that our minds extend beyond the boundary of our
skin and encompass the cognitive tools we use” (FM 160). as it applies to
fiction, this model “materially affects what is considered a presentation of
consciousness” (FM 160). palmer then leaves off to move to his main con-
cern, the social, “intramental” nature of fictional minds. without denying
the importance of this line of inquiry, i want to stay with the interrelations
between mind and environment as it bears on narrative analysis. while
palmer’s theorization of “social minds” provides plenty of leverage on fic-
tional analysis, particularly in how we read consciousness in novels that
were largely perceived as externally-oriented, plot-driven, and “realist,” his
bracketing off of “social minds” reproduces another binary: instead of
internal and external, we now have a privileged human realm of thought
and action over and against an implicitly nonhuman, background “envi-
ronment.” put in terms of bloom’s chapters in Ulysses, palmer gives us a
way to understand bloom’s mind in its relationality with the minds of peo-
ple he encounters – his wife molly, dlugacz the butcher, his acquaintance
m’coy, the chemist who sells him soap, and the mourners at paddy
dignam’s funeral – but he stops short of including other objects and non-
human creatures that are, like the kidney, “in” his mind. there are other
things that occupy bloom besides people: his cat, the cuts of meat at the
dlugacz’s, the newspaper he wipes himself with after defecating, the com-
munion wine and wafers he ponders at the catholic church, the odor of
porter seeping out from pubs, the soap he buys for molly, the envelope con-
taining the letter from martha gifford. for palmer, these nonhuman phys-
ical entities cannot be treated in the same category as the “minds” of other
characters in the novel. i would ask, perhaps naïvely, why not?
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in answering this question, we will still likely find reasons to put
human minds in a privileged conceptual category. we would do so, how-
ever, without an a priori separation of the human from and ontological
elevation above the nonhuman, material world. by broaching the tantaliz-
ing prospect of the narrative representation of physically distributed cog-
nition, palmer suggests this line of inquiry. ultimately, though, he declines
to pursue it, instead focusing on the intermental relationship between
human minds. it is at this point where narrative theory can be supple-
mented by recent work in philosophy, particularly work in object-oriented
ontology and other materialist approaches that grant an ontological pri-
macy to objects. in the main, this move is not intended to simply reverse
figure and background, pushing human subjects aside to welcome nonhu-
man objects to center stage, but it does aim to grant objects an existence
independent of human epistemology. this does not, importantly, deny the
inherent limitation of human cognition but, crucially, does not ontologi-
cally denigrate the object world simply because we are bound to species-
based cognitive limits. the most succinct phrase that sums up this vast
array of work is probably the title of levi bryant’s book, The Democracy
of Objects.6 bryant makes the point that a democracy of objects does not
imply an elevation of the nonhuman at the expense of the human:
such a democracy … does not entail the exclusion of the human. rather, what we
get is a redrawing of distinctions and a decentering of the human. the point is not
that we should think objects rather than humans. such a formulation is based on the
premise that humans constitute some special category that is other than objects, that
objects are a pole opposed to humans, and therefore the formulation is based on the
premise that objects are correlates or poles opposing or standing-before humans. no
… there is only one type of being: objects. as a consequence, humans are not
excluded, but are rather objects among the various types of objects that exist or pop-
ulate the world, each with their own specific powers and capacities. (bryant 20).
bryant’s claim that “there is only one type of being: objects,” might
jar on the human ear a bit, but it is important to stress what follows: if each
object has its “specific powers and capacities,” then humans have the ben-
efit of being uncommonly complex, productive, and evolutionarily suc-
cessful objects. what bryant cuts to is the affective attachment we have to
the concept of the “subject,” particularly the assumption that, however
much subjectivity is shaken, decentered, challenged, or vanquished, the
identity of the “subject” remains an exclusively human one.
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returning to the somewhat narrower scope of fictional representa-
tion: how might bryant’s philosophical gambit work? the answer to this
question demands that we reframe the fictional notion of character. most
theorists of narrative grant that some kind of human or anthropomorphized
agency is a minimal requirement of narrative. but we don’t need to chisel
out a precise definition of narrative to know, from experience, that the
overwhelming majority of narratives feature entities that we convention-
ally refer to as characters, to the point where most defintions of narrative
include the implicit or explicit requirement of characters.7 but the term
“character” presupposes so much: it is both, according to the oed, “a
personality invested with distinctive attributes and qualities, by a novelist
or dramatist,” and more broadly, “the sum of the moral and mental qual-
ities which distinguish an individual or a race, viewed as a homogeneous
whole” (oed). the usage of both senses dates from the 1660s, well before
the advent of the novel as a popular form, suggesting that both senses have
been operative since the early days of narrative fiction as we know it. both
definitions point toward a supposition of a “character” as a “homogenous
whole” with “distinctive attributes and qualities,” definitions that are in a
reader’s mind prior to encountering a specific fictional persona. in other
words, to return to bryant, we conventionally presume characters as pre-
existing subjects rather than the “objects” that bryant argues as the “only
type of being.” while i have no illusions that the habits of fictional read-
ing can be overturned completely, an object-oriented approach to charac-
ter might adopt a kind of binocular vision, through which we read fiction
with one eye on the conventional notion of character as a continuous,
coherent entity – a “whole person” – and the other on the construction of
character as one object among others within a narrative. viewing the fic-
tional representation of human consciousness would thus give a more
stereoscopic picture, highlighting relations, and indeed tensions, between
character-as-subject and character-as-object. 
the political philosopher Jane bennett sketches out a conceptual
framework that might be a useful start for an object-oriented approach to
narrative consciousness. in her book Vibrant Matter, bennett advocates a
theory of “vital materialism” that distributes agency formerly imagined to
be seated exclusively in humans to a more eclectic mesh of the human and
nonhuman (13). bennett borrows the notion of “actant” from bruno
latour to extend the potential of agency to all objects, human or other-
wise. an actant is simply “a source of action” that can be “human or not,
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or, most likely, a combination of both” (9). reprising bryant’s theme,
humans do not disappear in this formulation, but it does assume that
“human individuals are themselves composed of vital materials, that
[human] powers are thing-power” (11). we can begin to see where this
ontological shift speaks to the fictional construction of human character:
the “humans” that are so finely drawn in fiction lose none of their special
qualities if their distinctiveness is considered within the object world.
indeed, their agency becomes more extensive: “bodies enhance their
power in or as a heterogeneous assemblage. what this suggests for the
concept of agency is that the efficacy or effectivity to which that term has
traditionally referred becomes distributed across an ontologically hetero-
geneous field, rather than being a capacity localized in a human body” (23,
author’s italics). bennett’s notion of agency resonates helpfully with
palmer’s appropriation of “the mind beyond the skin” from cognitive the-
ory. a truly vital materialist theory of fictional consciousness, however,
would need to go one step further. bennett writes that while “[e]ach mem-
ber and proto-member of the assemblage has a certain vital force,” there
is also “an agency of the assemblage” itself (24). if we provisionally
named such an assemblage “mr leopold bloom,” as Joyce does in his
opening words to the “calypso” chapter, we are encompassing not only
the “homogenous whole” implied by the notion of character, but also the
aforementioned bits that form “bloom”: kidneys, cats, hats, newspapers,
sunshine, a dublin street, and so on. bennett continues: “and precisely
because each member-actant maintains an energetic pulse slightly ‘off’
from that of the assemblage, an assemblage is never a stolid block but an
open-ended collective, a ‘non-totalizable sum’” (24). bennett’s “assem-
blage” is a better description for the ceaseless interfacing between human
and nonhuman that comprises fictional consciousness because the human
aspect of identity is preserved, while, at the same time, the notion of char-
acter is opened to the text in more extensive and fine-grained ways. the
perception of fictional characters can be deepened and particularized by
viewing them less as inward entities reaching across a wide ontological
gulf to engage with the “real world” and more as shifting, contingent
nodes whose boundaries are fluid and whose identities are continually
remade in their contact with the world of objects.
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The Object Nature of Stephen and Bloom 
it remains to be seen how this abstract model of consciousness plays out
at the “ground level” of fiction. how does the model of a distributed
agency leave traces in the prose sentences that comprise fictional narra-
tion? i have already suggested that the narration of bloom’s consciousness
makes these interfaces particularly clear. but bloom’s narration begins
four chapters into the novel, after the first three have been devoted to
stephen dedalus. both stephen and bloom are narrated in roughly the
same perspective: third-person free indirect discourse giving way, at times
almost imperceptibly, to sentences or chunks of first-person direct mono-
logue. david lodge gives a representative summary of this mode: “[i]t is
not the authorial voice who speaks in these interpolated passages of intro-
spection and analysis, but the inner voice of the character himself or her-
self who is the ‘center of consciousness,’ rendered in interior monologue
or free indirect style, and mingled with the accents of other discourses,
written and spoken, which belong to that character’s mental world” (65).
this description is somewhat broad and, taken on its own terms, does
describe the majority of what is conventionally referred to as “stream of
consciousness” narration. but even lodge acknowledges that, within
Ulysses itself, the three main characters are represented “in three quite dis-
tinctive styles – as regards vocabulary, syntax, and the type of association,
whether metaphoric or metonymic, that makes one thought beget another”
(56). i am here concerned with the contrast between stephen and bloom
(with molly’s exclusively first-person narration comprising a separate cat-
egory for my purposes): while lodge expresses the contrast as a difference
in style, i suggest that we see a stronger qualitative distinction between the
two characters, which has implications for the way in which Joyce repre-
sents consciousness.
Joyce himself lays some of the groundwork for my claims about the
stephen/bloom distinction. through stephen’s allusions to philosophers
of perception such as aristotle, Jakob boehme, and bishop berkeley,
“proteus” stages an inquiry into the relations between subjective percep-
tion and objective reality. as James cappio argues, stephen begins the
chapter as “a solipsist trying to come to terms with the objective world”
(21). cappio posits that stephen views this problem as a struggle between
a berkeleyan radical subjectivity and an aristotelian insistence on a phys-
ical reality of primary substances. as much as the chapter foregrounds the
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subjective cast of stephen’s perception, imagination, and memory, he ends
by placing his own snot on a rock and contemplating a sailing ship mov-
ing upstream into the mouth of the liffey. stephen’s famous question,
“am i walking into eternity along sandymount strand?” (U 3.18-19),
should therefore, by the end of the chapter, be answered in a resounding
negative. “proteus” suggests that stephen’s experiments in subjective
withdrawal ultimately give way to an embodied, physical world of things.
or, as cappio puts it, “aristotle wins at the end of ‘proteus’” (21). with
the “victory” of the external world, stephen is ushered off the stage and
bloom proceeds in from the wings. throughout the first three chapters,
however, stephen’s predilection for an inward subjectivity is expressed
through his narrative discourse, which typically places the veil of a unified
“style” between stephen’s perception and its expression on the page.
here is an example of stephen’s represented consciousness from the
“nestor” chapter, a moment in which he reflects upon the mystical and
theological roots of the algebraic equations that he tries to teach to the dull
student, sargent:
across the page the symbols moved in grave morrice, in the mummery of their let-
ters, wearing quaint caps of squares and cubes. give hands, traverse, bow to part-
ner: so: imps of fancy of the moors. gone too from the world, averroes and moses
maimonides, dark men in mien and movement, flashing in their mocking mirrors
the obscure soul of the world, a darkness shining in brightness which brightness
could not comprehend. (U 2.155-60)8
lodge suggests that what we receive here is not an authorial voice
but rather a simulation of stephen’s consciousness as it perceives the text
of the algebra book. on the one hand, we can ascribe much of this passage
to what we know of stephen (not just from Ulysses but from A Portrait of
the Artist as a Young Man as well): the references to obscure, heterodox
theologian-philosophers, the personification of mathematical abstractions,
the ornate syntax, and the alliterative, poetic quality of the language used.
Yet, despite the plausibility that the intellectually sophisticated stephen
might “think” like this, the gap between a mimetic transcription of thought
and its stylized representation here is surely too wide to ignore. if this pas-
sage finds its source in an “inner voice” of stephen, it is one that bears the
unmistakeable traces of a narratorial intervention and transformation.
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when we see stephen’s relationship to the object that occupies his
perception – the algebra book – it becomes clear that the conception of
stephen as a consciousness is in fact contingent upon the grammatical and
stylistic “packaging” of this consciousness by the narrator. the first sen-
tence is a third-person description that uses words that stephen might use
– “grave morrice,” “mummery,” “quaint caps of squares and cubes” – but
is too grammatically complete and crafted to pass for a direct perception
of stephen’s. this perceptual sentence quickly gives way to stephen’s
imaginative connection between the algebraic symbols and the scholasti-
cism of moorish culture. the colons lead us through the logic of the asso-
ciation: the dancing figures resolve into a “so” that transforms them into
“imps of fancy.” but this apparent fragment resembles the movement of a
logical proof rather than an umprompted association, emphasizing the
rational, conscious discourse of stephen. the long sentence that closes the
paragraph is presented with a similar sense of craft: its paratactic connec-
tions from clause to clause indicate an associative pattern, but the alliter-
ation, diction, and complex construction (“a darkness shining in bright-
enss which brightness could not comprehend”) again signify a
“stephenization” of this perception that can only be externally achieved
by the narrator. the object that prompts this brief reflection – the algebra
notebook – is subordinated to the stylistic and logical traits of stephen’s
mind, which, in contrast to bryant’s formulation, very much renders him
as a “subject” distanced from and superior to an external world of objects.
i have suggested that bloom’s case is different; let me know ampli-
fy that claim. structurally, many of bloom’s passages follow the same pat-
tern, with third-person free indirect discourse giving way to bits of implied
direct monologue. the fourth paragraph of the “calypso” chapter begins
to introduce these first-person fragments more fully: “another slice of
bread and butter: three, four: right. she didn’t like her plate full. right. He
turned from the tray, lifted the kettle off the hob and set it sideways on the
fire. It sat there, dull and squat, its spout stuck out. cup of tea soon. good.
mouth dry” (U 4.14, my italics). the italicized sentences, which indicate
an unequivocal use of third-person narration, are lodged within fragments
that are meant to approximate a present-tense unfolding of interior mono-
logue. in bloom’s passages, there tends to be a marked distinction
between third-person sentences that report action or perception in an
unadorned way and first-person fragments that simulate bloom’s thought.
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several paragraphs later, the reporting third-person of “he watched the
bristles shining wirily in the weak light as she tipped three times and
licked lightly” gives way to the bloomian thought, “wonder is it true if
you clip them they can’t mouse after” (U 4.39-41). where stephen’s nar-
ration tends to have a more uniform stylistic wash, bloom’s mode typi-
cally moves from third-person declarative statements of action to a frag-
mented, present-tense, first-person mode that creates the impression of a
“naïve” rather than a stylized representation of a fictional mind.
this alternating mode is better suited to constituting bloom as an
object within networks of other objects. first of all, the representation of
bloom resists the merger between an overarching style and a narrative
sense of “self.” certainly, there are plenty of third-person descriptive sen-
tences of stephen’s actions in the first three chapters, but the joins
between the narrator and stephen are typically effected through subtle
modulations in point of view or language, as in the following: “he
watched her pour into the measure and thence into the jug rich white milk,
not hers. old shrunken paps. she poured again a measureful and a tilly.
old and secret she had entered from a morning world, maybe a messen-
ger” (U 1.397-400). even the first sentence of this paragraph borrows
stephen’s discourse, namely the florid use of “thence” and the observation
that sets up his next thought, “not hers.” by contrast, bloom’s direct,
monologic narration typically occurs after a more unadorned description
of an object or scene. his internal speech therefore seems responsive or
reactive to an external world, suggesting connection, rather than stephen’s
more withdrawn, evaluative statements, which suggest removal and
abstraction. bloom’s first-person fragments, following the fairly neutral
report of his watching the cat, for example, are not terribly remarkable in
terms of insight or artistry – but this response to an object in the exterior
world prompts us to ascribe personality traits to bloom: curiosity and
empathy. the “mind” of bloom does not extrude into the material realm,
as many cognitive theorists would have it; his consciousness, rather, is
already exteriorized as it is formed through his perceptual attention to
objects in the world.
one way of indexing this constitution of an externalized, distributed
consciousness is through the novel’s emphasis on bloom’s sensory contact
with the world. sara danius has written of the role of sensory perception
in the novel, arguing that “Ulysses registers the social history of that inter-
face between world and embodied individual known as the sensorium”
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(151). referring to a scene in which bloom responds to the smell of
onions on a man’s breath, as well as the scene where bloom visits the
butcher’s, she writes that “[s]ausages, onions, and the like make up a vast
sensory space crowded by animated objects that actively enter into dia-
logue with bloom’s sensory apparatus, which they simultaneously help to
define” (152). i follow danius in her claim that bloom’s sensory faculties
are a blending of subject and object; in fact, this physical, embodied merg-
er reminds us that whatever we take to be bloom’s consciousness – the
“character” of bloom – is inseparable from the physical interface with the
world. it also seems logical that the emphasis on bloom’s embodiment
stands in contrast to the more cerebrally oriented representation of
stephen. what we take to be bloom’s consciousness, in other words, is
often simply an awareness of his own body in the world. when he is rid-
ing in the carriage and trying unsuccessfully to avoid thinking about
boylan’s assignation with molly, he moves from looking at his fingernails
to reflecting on his own aging body: “my nails. i am just looking at them:
well pared. and after: thinking alone. body getting a bit softy. i would
notice that: from remembering. what causes that? i suppose the skin can’t
contract quickly enough when the flesh falls off” (U 6.203-6). this is a
typical “stream of consciousness” passage from bloom, but it really
amounts to little more than a self-report on his own embodiment. even in
his most “subjective” moments, we are never far from understanding
bloom as a materialized object.
ultimately, we assess the narrative articulation of fictional con-
sciousness by examining how narrative conveys a particular flavor and
texture of subjective experience, or what cognitive theorists call qualia,
which might be translated, according to palmer, as the phrase “what it’s
like” (FM 97, author’s italics). while debates continue among cognitive
scientists about whether or not humans think in language, if we take fic-
tional narration as a figural, rather than literal, expression of conscious-
ness, we can begin to sort out differences and distinctions. i have previ-
ously highlighted the ways in which bloom’s qualia contrast with
stephen’s: based on their respective narrative discourse (which includes
both third- and first-person sentences), stephen appears more internalized,
abstracted, self-centered, while bloom comes to us as more externalized,
engaged, and other-centered. what is striking about Joyce’s method,
though, is that bloom seldom expresses “feelings” in the same way as
stephen. we are made to infer some internal emotional states through his
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interactions with other people and things in the world, but these are sel-
dom conveyed overtly. bloom’s qualia – “what it’s like” to be bloom –
are largely left blank or implied. this restrained method pays off, for
example, when bloom encounters a situation that cannot but prompt an
emotional response. in the “hades” chapter, as bloom rides in the funeral
procession for paddy dignam, he is reminded both of his infant son’s
death and his father’s suicide. rather than dominate his attention through-
out the chapter, the deaths of his loved ones are passed over in the matter
of a few sentences each. recalling the inquest into his father’s death,
bloom thinks: “the redlabelled bottle on the table. the room in the hotel
with hunting pictures. stuffy it was. sunlight through the slats of the
venetian blind. the coroner’s sunlit ears, big and hairy. boots giving evi-
dence. thought he was asleep first” (U 6.359-62). the content of bloom’s
narration feels almost photographic, focused on the concrete images in his
memory without any indicators of a specific emotional state. the only ele-
ment that suggests emotional distress is the fragmented brevity of the sen-
tences, as if the traumatic memories must be dispelled by the rapid move-
ment from image to image. bloom’s trauma is conveyed through what is
implied, and the qualia of his memories are left in the unspoken gaps
between the physical objects that are narrated on the page. 
Conclusion: Enmeshed Narration
according to lodge, in Ulysses, Joyce “came as close to representing the
phenomenon of consciousness as perhaps any writer has ever done in the
history of literature” (56). while i don’t feel entirely comfortable with
such sweeping assessments, lodge does express what has become a criti-
cal commonplace, especially with respect to leopold bloom. i would
qualify lodge’s claim by saying that, whether or not Joyce “represents the
phenomenon” of consciousness in a mimetically superior way, there are
elements to his style of narration that are particularly effective. ironically,
perhaps, the representation of consciousness is at its most compelling
when it is at its most externalized. that is, when consciousness is
expressed as a contingent, embodied assemblage in ever-shifting inter-
faces with the external world (as it is in bloom’s case), the reader is left to
construct a mind actively rather than receive the “homogenous whole” of
a character as so many traits that might be condensed to a short list. we
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are invited into the distributed agency of narrative consciousness as anoth-
er actant in a tremendously complex network. the reader’s construction of
“character,” then, never feels like the “homogenous whole” of in the
defini tion: instead, it is a heterogeneous, messy set of connections and
responses that ultimately resolves into a conceptually distinct “thing,” but
a thing that is never static, inert, and closed. 
finally, one implication of my reading goes beyond the aesthetic
reassessment of the fictional representation of consciousness. many of the
thinkers who advocate an object-oriented approach make an implicit (and
sometimes explicit) critique of the consequences of anthropocentrism and
the ontological separation of human and nonhuman worlds. we have, of
course, come a long way from georg lukacs’ assertion that the modernist
representation of consciousness is a celebration of the “solitary, asocial”
nature of humanity (1219). but even critical endeavors to suggest the so -
cia lity of fictional consciousness, such as palmer’s, continue to maintain
an unexamined divide between the human and nonhuman. some of this is
simply due to the constitutive role of human (or anthropomorphized)
agents in literary narratives; narratives require characters, simply put. by
examining closely how such human agents are constructed, however, we
can see more clearly that the ontological divide between human and non-
human, between subject and object, is at best a blurry, shifting, and
enmeshed realm. bloom, perhaps more than any other character in fiction,
bears the discursive traces of this meshing of immaterial mind and mate-
rial world.9
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BA Note, Notes, Anmerkungen, Notes
1 in-text references to Ulysses will be indicated by chapter and line number
from the gabler edition. 
2 bloom’s association with bodily organs is writ large in the structural con-
ception of the novel, as the gilbert schema for the novel identifies each
chapter, beginning with calypso, with a bodily organ. not surprisingly, the
organ that corresponds to “calypso” is the kidney. significantly, Joyce does
not identify any organs for stephen’s first three chapters. in the other chap-
ter to significantly feature stephen, “scylla & charybdis,” the organ that
Joyce chooses is “brain.” on the one hand, this “anatomy” suggests the
metaphor of the novel as a living being; but, on the other hand, Joyce’s con-
ception of this living being is constitued through the material components of
the body rather than the disembodied abstraction of a cartesian mind.
3 see especially david herman, The Emergence of Mind: Representations of
Consciousness in Narrative Discourse in Fiction (lincoln: university of
nebraska press, 2011); lisa zunshine, Why We Read Fiction: Theory of
Mind and the Novel (columbus: ohio state university press, 2006; palmer,
Fictional Minds and Social Minds in the Novel.
4 hereafter abbreviated in the text as FM and SMN.
5 see daniel dennett, Kinds of Minds: Toward an Understanding of
Consciousness (new York: basic books, 1996). 
6 bryant’s work fits broadly within the parameters of the philosophical move-
ment known as object-oriented ontology, but it is not meant to stand in for a
rather diverse body of thinkers, among whom include: bruno latour, graham
harman, timothy morton, Jane bennett, ian bogost, Quentin meillasoux,
and others. a helpful introduction to the main concepts in o.o.o. can be
found in harman, Tool Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects
(peru, il: open court publishing, 2002). the literary critic bill brown has
approached these questions from a different, though related, standpoint in his
conception of “thing theory.” see A Sense of Things: Object Matter in
American Literature (chicago: university of chicago press, 2004).
7 while there are many definitions of narrative, some minimalist and others
more particular, i prefer this by James phelan and peter rabinowitz:
“narrative is somebody telling somebody else, on some occasion, and for
some purposes, that something happened to someone or something”. the
three “somebodies” in this definition, which roughly correspond to narrator,
listener/reader, and character(s), highlight the inescapably human element to
narrative. see Narrative Theory: Core Concepts and Critical Debates, eds.
david herman et al. (columbus: ohio state university press, 2012).
8 my thanks to samantha solomon for directing me to this particularly poetic
passage of stephen’s narration.
9 my special thanks to the students of my “nonhuman modernisms” graduate
seminar at washington state university, fall semester 2013. their insights
about Ulysses helped me work through key parts of this essay and they are
all, at some level, collaborators in this project.
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1.
ein topos der trakl-forschung besagt, diese dichtung würde oft zur
obskurität neigen. schon walther killys klassiker Über Georg Trakl
(1960), der als erster auf textgenetische fragen in trakls dichtung ein-
ging, beginnt mit dem verhängnisvollen satz “die sprache dieses dichters
ist dunkel”, und setzt emphatisch fort, indem er die hilflosigkeit des
lesers gegenüber dieser sprache als hindernis auf dem weg einer exi-
stenziellen suche nach hilfe beklagt:
man kann dem sinnlichen klang der worte, den vielen farben und schatten sich
öffnen, aber es ist nicht leicht, dahinter mehr zu gewahren, das, was wir heute
(vielleicht zu unrecht) von dichtung zu erwarten uns gewöhnt haben: hilfe in der
ortlosigkeit unserer welt, antwort auf die fragen nach unserem dasein, ordnende
bilder in den verwirrungen der seele und der zeit. es ist hier nicht zu entschei-
den, ob die dichtung das, was man von ihr erwartet, leisten kann. selbst wenn sie
es zu leisten vermöchte, stehen wir doch den versen trakls nicht einsichtsvoller
gegenüber. (5)1
killy zufolge entziehen sich trakls texte insofern der interpretation,
als ihre bilder ein offenes system von chiffren bilden, die einerseits auf-
einander verweisen, deren bedeutung andererseits aber auch kontextab-
hängig ist und sich deshalb immer wieder leicht verschiebt:
Elisabetta Mengaldo
Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universität Greifswald
“sanft ist der amsel klage”. motivstrukturen
bei georg trakl
